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Abstract 
 
The article assesses, for the first time, the significance of the sociologist, philosopher, and 
conservative political theorist Hans Freyer for German conceptual history. Freyer theorized 
historical structures as products of political activity, emphasized the presence of several 
historical layers in each moment, and underscored the need to read concepts with regard to 
accumulated structures. He thus gave significant impulses not only to German structural 
history but also to conceptual history emerging out of it in the work of Otto Brunner, Werner 
Conze, and, most notably, Reinhart Koselleck, whose theories of temporal layers in history 
and concepts reworked the Freyerian starting points. Underscoring the openness and plurality 
of history, criticizing its false “plannability,” and reading world history as European history 
writ large, Freyer shaped the politically oriented theory of history behind Koselleckian 
Begriffsgeschichte. Further, Freyer theorized the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century transition 
to the industrial society as a historical rupture or “epochal threshold”, which bears close, and 
by no means coincidental, similarity to Koselleck’s saddle time thesis. Freyer’s theory of 
history sheds light on the interrelations of many Koselleckian key ideas, including temporal 
layers, the contemporaneousness of the non-contemporaneous, the plannability of history, and 
the saddle time. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Rather than being a mere set of practices, German conceptual history carries an embedded 
theory of history and modernity. This is arguably both its strength and a potential source of 
restraints, possibly hindering its generalizability beyond European spaces. Begriffsgeschichte 
arose at a particular juncture in European history, the dynamics of which the theorists sought 
to comprehend by engaging with modern political and social concepts. To understand its 
current forms, we must dig into the historical layers upon which Begriffsgeschichte stands. 
The present article is a part of such a continued endeavor. It engages with the work of the 
German conservative sociologist, historian, and philosopher Hans Freyer (1887--1969) and 
maps his role in the genesis of German conceptual history, proposing significant parallels and 
direct historical links. The essay starts by discussing the social historians Otto Brunner (1898-
-1982) and Werner Conze (1910--1986) and then turns to Reinhart Koselleck (1923--2006), 
the most central theorist of the methodology of Begriffsgeschichte. 
My key claim is that Freyer, in a complex, cumulative, and collective process of reception, 
provided significant impulses not only to German structural history but also to the history of 
concepts that emerged out of it. Freyerian themes were filtered into Koselleck’s theories 
partly through his seniors, partly in direct engagement with Freyer’s thought. We comprehend 
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many of Koselleck’s methodological categories, such as “time layers,” “contemporaneousness 
of the non-contemporaneous,” “saddle time,” or the plurality of history, in more nuance when 
we read them against the background of Freyer’s historical theory. This also helps better us 
conceive the interrelations between these notions, the metaphorical imagery guiding 
Koselleck’s use of them, and the politically oriented theory of history underlying the whole 
edifice. 
Freyer began his career with expressionistic essays and Hegelian cultural philosophy.1 In 
the late Weimar period, he theorized the foundations of the new discipline of sociology in 
Leipzig, framing sociology as the methodologically sound analysis of social reality in 
historical categories.2 In his concurring radical phase, Freyer theorized the state in ostensibly 
Hegelian categories, anticipated what he called “a revolution from the Right,” and celebrated 
the state’s ability to wage wars in the name of the Volk, first supporting the Nazi regime, but 
gradually growing more critical of its doctrines.3 During and after the Second World War, 
Freyer deradicalized4 his ardent nationalism into general reflections of Europe’s historical 
significance in world history and the Western cultural heritage in general – thereby turning 
from the active call for revolutionary deeds into culturally conservative observations of 
historical phenomena on the global scale.5 Nevertheless, the motivating force behind 
Weltgeschichte Europas, written during the war but published in 1948, was to comprehend 
the novel ideological division of the world in widest historical categories – and thereby also 
indirectly relativize the recent German war effort into a minor incident in global history. In 
Theorie des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters (1955) and Schwelle der Zeiten (1965), Freyer criticized 
modern mass societies from a moderate anthropological perspective, now toning down his 
radicalism in favor of “traditional” conservatism primarily concerned with the fate of culture, 
individuality, and meaning in the modern “industrial societies.” He suggested historical 
traditions and cultural heritage as counter-measures to modern rootlessness and theorized the 
transition to the industrial societies as a major anthropological shift in human history, gaining 
wide popularity in the postwar West Germany.6 Despite the changes, there are also significant 
continuities between Freyer’s prewar and postwar work, and his ideas found resonance 
amongst those in need of alternative cultural explanations for the post-WW2 predicament, 
those resisting too rapid “Westernization,” and those struggling with their own dubious past. 
Freyer’s thought, however, also shaped academic historiography. Scholars have noted 
Freyer’s influence on German social history as exercised particularly by Brunner and Conze. 
Kaminsky and Van Horn Melton note how the origins of Brunner’s historical thought laid “in 
the antiliberal thinking of pre-Nazi Weimar intellectuals like Carl Schmitt and Hans Freyer.”7 
In Veit-Brause’s formulation, Conze “responded favorably to [Freyer’s] ... historically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hans Freyer, Antäus: Grundlegung einer Ethik des bewussten Lebens (Jena: Diederichs, 1922[1918]); Hans 
Freyer, Prometheus: Ideen zur Philosophie der Kultur (Jena: Diederichs, 1923); Hans Freyer, Theorie des 
objektiven Geistes: Eine Einleitung in die Kulturphilosophie (Leipzig: Teubner, 1934[1923]). 
2 Hans Freyer, Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft: Logische Grundlegung des Systems der Soziologie 
(Leipzig: Teubner, 1930); Hans Freyer, Einleitung in die Soziologie (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1931). 
3 Hans Freyer, Der Staat (Leipzig: Rechfelden, 1925); Hans Freyer, Revolution von Rechts (Jena: Diederichs, 
1931); Hans Freyer, Pallas Athene: Ethik des politischen Volkes (Jena: Diederichs, 1935); Hans Freyer, Die 
Politische Insel: Eine Geschichte der Utopien von Platon bis zur Gegenwart (Wien: Karolinger, 2000[1936]). 
4 On Freyer’s shift, see particularly Jerry Z. Muller, The Other God that Failed: Hans Freyer and the 
Deradicalization of German Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
5 Hans Freyer, Weltgeschichte Europas, 2 volumes (Wiesbaden: Dieterich, 1948). 
6 Hans Freyer, Theorie des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1955); Hans Freyer, 
Schwelle der Zeiten: Beiträge zur Soziologie der Kultur (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965). 
7 Howard Kaminsky & James Van Horn Melton, “Translators’ Introduction,” in Otto Brunner, Land and 
Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria, trans. Howard Kaminsky and James Van Horn Melton 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), xli. 
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minded sociological theory.”8 Thomas Etzemüller considers Freyer’s influence on Conze as 
“clearly perceptible,” while Jan Eike Dunkhause sees Freyer as “doubtless the contemporary 
thinker that had the greatest influence on Conze during the post-war years.”9 Jin-Sung Chun 
concludes that Freyer was a crucial link between prewar radical conservatism and postwar 
structural history10, while Jerry Z. Muller remarks that the turn toward social history in 
Germany was “Freyer’s greatest influence within the academy” and that Conze was “the most 
direct link between Freyer and the new social history.”11 
The observation of Freyer’s centrality for social history has become common currency, but 
scholars have so far overlooked how Freyer’s ideas also guided the emergence of the history 
of concepts out of social history. In their almost exhaustive compendium of 
Begriffsgeschichte, Ernst Müller and Falko Schmieder note Freyer as background for Conze’s 
engagement with the “epochal threshold of 1800” and Koselleck’s commentary of “the 
industrial society” as well as mention Freyer’s theory of historically “satiated” concepts, 
albeit only as context for Carl Schmitt’s parallel endeavors and without giving Freyer much 
role in the genesis of the approach.12 The parallels between Freyer and Begriffsgeschichte, 
however, are systematic, and I will therefore revisit the link between Freyer and social history 
-- albeit only insofar as is necessary for adding layers to our comprehension of the genesis of 
Begriffsgeschichte. 
A particularly decisive question is that regarding the relationship between Freyer and 
Koselleck -- the theorist who gave Begriffsgeschichte its clearest contours. Koselleck’s texts 
contain only few explicit references to Freyer, yet there are numerous point of contention 
between their respective theories, and indirect evidence suggests Koselleck was familiar with 
Freyer’s work more broadly.13 The scholarly remarks on this nexus, however, are very few 
and sporadic. Perceiving Koselleck as representative of a wider tendency in postwar German 
historiography, Jin-Sung Chun notes how the young Koselleck shared Freyer’s “ambivalent 
view of the Enlightenment” as well as analyzed, “analogously with Freyer,” the 
Enlightenment in terms of both continuities and discontinuities and traced the progress-
orientation in eighteenth-century philosophy of history to medieval eschatology.14 In his 
biographical account on Koselleck, Niklas Olsen first summarizes Freyer’s influence on 
Conze and situates Koselleck in Conze’s footsteps without, however, commenting on 
Koselleck’s direct engagement with Freyer, and later mentions Freyer as a representative, 
alongside Löwith, of the general interest in the future orientation and expectations in 
nineteenth-century thought, thereby relativizing Koselleck’s uniqueness in the German mid-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Irmline Veit-Brause, “Werner Conze (1910--1986): The Measure of History and the Historian’s Measures,” in 
Paths of Continuity: Central European Historiography from the 1930s to the 1950s, ed. Hartmut Lehmann & 
James van Horn Melton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 310. 
9 Thomas Etzemüller, Sozialgeschichte als politische Geschichte: Werner Conze und die Neuorientierung der 
westdeutschen Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001), 60; Jan Eike Dunkhase, Werner 
Conze: Ein deutscher Historiker im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 129-130. 
10 Jin-Sung Chun, Das Bild der Moderne in der Nachkriegszeit: Die Westdeutsche “Strukturgeschichte” im 
Spannungsfeld von Modernitätskritik und wissenschaftlicher Innovation 1948–1962 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
2000), 34. 
11 Muller, Other God, 357. 
12 Ernst Müller & Falko Schmieder, Begriffsgeschichte und historische Semantik: Ein kritisches Kompendium 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2016), 214, 276, 306. 
13 The Reinhart Koselleck Library in Deutsches Literaturarchiv (DLA), Marbach, includes Koselleck’s 
exemplars of Freyer’s books. Particularly Theorie des Gegenwärtigen Zeitalters and Politische Grundbegriffe 
have been marked, while Der Staat and Revolution von Rechts are annotated selectively and decorated with 
marginalia, including question marks to signal reservations on Freyer’s ideologically dubious claims. Neither 
Weltgeschichte Europas nor Schwelle der Zeiten are available in DLA or the Koselleck Library in Timisoara, 
Romania. 
14 Jin-Sung, Bild, 82-83. 
	   4 
twentieth-century academia.15 While these remarks underscore the relevance of the 
Freyer/Koselleck link, they hardly go beneath the surface. After setting the stage with 
Brunner and Conze, I will therefore address this relationship directly with regard to several 
particular topics molding conceptual history. 
My reading supplements earlier accounts that have linked conceptual history with radical 
conservatism. Scholars have particularly assessed Carl Schmitt’s role in Koselleck’s 
intellectual formation and the consequences of his mentoring for the methodology of 
Begriffsgeschichte16, but a balanced picture necessitates reckoning with another former 
radical conservative. Freyer’s case, however, is different, given his own postwar attempt at a 
deradicalization of his political categories, whereas Schmitt never lost his acrimony. Further, 
while Conze and Brunner engaged directly with Freyer’s ideas during the Third Reich, 
Koselleck, mostly utilizing Freyer’s postwar work, seems to have received the politically 
dubious impulses mediated through his senior colleagues. In linking conceptual history with 
radical conservatism, my aim, obviously, is not to discredit the approach as politically 
dubious or inevitably conservative. Rather the proposed links are contingent facts in 
intellectual history, and their ramifications should be acknowledged and, where appropriate, 
remedied with more balanced views. The approach of Begriffsgeschichte -- contingently -- 
arose amidst devastating historical-political challenges and out of highly particular substantial 
interpretations of European history, and to comprehend that particularity is not to deny the 
merits, or lessen the utility, of the approach. Koselleck once diagnosed Brunner’s postwar 
turn from ideological Volksgeschichte to academic Strukturgeschichte as an example of how 
“politically conditioned knowledge-interests may lead to theoretically and methodologically 
novel insights that outlast their initial situation.”17 This formulation is extendable to 
Koselleck’s own work, which developed from political pessimism to mature theorizing of 
historical times. 
I will assess Freyer’s role in this transition by means of three thematic interventions. I first 
analyze Freyer’s influence on Brunner’s and Conze’s history of structures, the key concepts 
of which Koselleck adopted to his socially oriented conceptual history and his theory of 
historical times. The next section engages with the parallels in how Freyer and Koselleck, 
respectively, conceived of history, ideological planning, and concepts in modernity. The last 
section scrutinizes Freyer’s idea of epochal thresholds and its links with Koselleck’s saddle 
time thesis, later reformulated as “threshold time.” 
 
II Historical Structures and Multilayered Concepts 
 
In the 1920s and 1930s, Freyer retained the outline of his inherited Hegelianism, yet sought to 
historicize the study of society and purify it of any traits of telos-oriented philosophy of 
history. Radically aware of the contemporary relevance of past events and the capacity of 
particularly political peoples to shape the future, Freyer argued that history consisted of 
political decisions that accumulated into the whole of world history. This was so, because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Niklas Olsen, History in the Plural: An Introduction to the Work of Reinhart Koselleck (New York: Berghahn, 
2012), 119-123, 127-128. 
16 Kari Palonen, Die Entzauberung der Begriffe: Das Umschreiben der politischen Begriffe bei Quentin Skinner 
und Reinhart Koselleck (Münster: Lit, 2004), 51–59; Reinhard Mehring, “Begriffssoziologie, Begriffsgeschichte, 
Begriffspolitik: Zur Form der Ideenge- schichtsschreibung nach Carl Schmitt und Reinhart Koselleck,” In 
Politische Ideengeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert: Konzepte und Kritik, ed. Harald Bluhm and Jürgen Gebhardt 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006); Timo Pankakoski, “Conflict, Context, Concreteness: Koselleck and Schmitt on 
Concepts,” Political Theory 38, no. 6 (2010), 749-779; Olsen, History. 
17 Reinhart Koselleck, “Sozialgeschichte und Begriffsgeschichte,” [1986], in Begriffsgeschichten: Studien zur 
Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006) [hereafter 
Begriffsgeschichten], 12n4. 
	   5 
decisions gave rise to historical structures, which then lived longer than the original political 
impulses. The transition into the industrial society was such a historical shift – and an 
ongoing process. To bring home these points, Freyer particularly mobilized geological and 
volcanic metaphors, which I will next analyze in order to later establish links to Brunner, 
Conze, and Koselleck. 
In his political-literary essays, Freyer celebrated political vitality, unpredictability, and 
ruthlessness. Some things, he noted in 1923, grew through “thousand-year-long stratification 
[Schichtung],” others through “volcanic moments.”18 Although “the tellurian process of 
civilization” had gradually built a “crust of civilization” around the Earth “like a geological 
formation,” there were still political powers capable of “bursting through the cover” and 
“breaking through” the “structure [Gefüge] of historical time” into the unknown future.19 
Epoch-making political decisions were thus, metaphorically, like outbursts of lava that first 
smoldered underground and then reshaped the crust of the Earth. In his national-socialist 
period, Freyer defined politics precisely as the ability to restructure the accumulated historical 
strata: politics was “volcanic eruption” and “bursting through all that which is widely layered 
[breitgelagert],” something that only begins where god-like powers “burst from history’s 
molten core of the Earth through the cover of civilization,” when “volcanic masses burst 
through the widely layered and crosswise stratified structure [breitgelagerte und 
quergeschichtete Gefüge] of grown rocks,” and when “political will” breaks through “the 
peaceful sediment.”20 The irony, however, was that such creative powers would themselves 
eventually become strata in the accumulating mass they now pierced. 
With the very same imagery, Freyer also expressed the contemporary relevance of the past 
in his sociological writings in the early 1930s. Against Hegel, Freyer posited that history 
consisted of the accumulation of historical situations into layers (Schichten), not transitions 
between stages (Stufen).21 History was not linear movement toward a pre-set goal, let alone 
the humankind’s advancement on a moral ladder, but the lower strata could resurface at any 
point. Further, the stratified past was not only something anterior, but also contemporary, 
because historical reality provided the basis for contemporary events, or the “historical 
substructure of our own reality.”22 Central social forms like “community” or “class society” 
were always present as “enclosed [eingelagerte] layers of the overall structure” which 
“overlay [überlagern] and permeated [durchdringen] each other” so that there were no 
“‘pure’ structures,” but a “plurality of structural elements” -- and societal reality was therefore 
“multilayered” (vielschichtig).23 
This general idea and the supporting imagery remained in Freyer’s moderately 
conservative postwar work: for him, history was “the stratification [Schichtung] of the world 
in which we currently live ... just like the Earth is the stratified structure of layers and 
eruptions [Schichtengefüge der Lagen und Eruptionen].”24 Yet it was crucial to pay in mind, 
Freyer noted, that such “deep stratification [Tiefenschichtung]”25 emerged through political 
decisions, and historical layers testified to the successes or failures of past political projects. 
History, Freyer posited, happened “through” such “crosswise striped [quergestreift]” 
material26 -- just like he earlier defined politics as the ability to pierce “crosswise stratified” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Freyer, Prometheus, 9.  
19 Ibid., 53-55, 58, 111-112. 
20 Hans Freyer, Pallas Athene: Ethik des politischen Volkes (Jena: Diederichs, 1935), 39-40. 
21 Freyer, Soziologie, 217. 
22 Ibid., 89. 
23 Freyer, Einleitung, 128-129. 
24 Freyer, Theorie, 177. Koselleck has heavily underlined this passage in his exemplar. 
25 Freyer, Weltgeschichte, I, 148. 
26 Hans Freyer, “Soziologie und Geschichtswissenschaft,” [1952], reprinted in Geschichte und Soziologie, ed. 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1972), 79-80. 
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rocks, and occasionally the course of history was changed in “a sudden re-stratification of the 
temporal structure [Umlagerung der Zeitstruktur].”27 The model of history as geology was 
thus inherently linked with the political aspect: history was political through and through, and 
the current world was a stratified product of past political decisions. This compound of 
history and politics remained intact when Freyer “deradicalized” his theory into a melancholy, 
rather than militant, version of conservatism. 
Crucially, the observation of such decision-based structures also facilitated the historical 
relativization of current structures: particularly Freyer’s main target, the civil society, was not 
a natural form of social life, but a product of “a certain division of wealth, a certain valid legal 
order, a certain stratification [Lagerung] of political forces, and a certain intellectual 
situation.”28 German sociology, Freyer claimed, should promote the concepts of state and 
people (Volk) against the foreign idea of ‘society’: in fact, society should be overcome with 
“higher forms of community,” relying on “deeper forces and structures.”29 For Freyer, the 
historical relativization of ‘society’ was merely the first step toward transcending this alien 
category altogether in favor of the unified Volk, and sociology was to play a key role in this 
political mission, as Freyer proclaimed at the height of his radical period. The same point of 
society not being “a historically neutral category,” but a result of an “overall situation 
[Gesamtlage] through which the stream of historical events runs,” however, was clearly 
spelled already in his 1930 program for historical sociology.30 
The above theorizing guided German structural history in its formative period and, I claim, 
also shaped the emergence of conceptual history. Werner Conze is usually credited for 
coining the term “the history of structures” (Strukturgeschichte). Yet, as Dunkhase points out, 
this was mostly a terminological change, because Brunner had spoken of structures all along 
without, however, using the exact expression “Strukturgeschichte.”31 Conze coined the term 
first in French as ‘histoire des structures’ in a review of Braudel’s La Méditerraneé in 1951 
and a year later in the eventual German form, again evoking Braudel’s authority.32 However, 
as Dunkhase notes, Braudel never used the exact term ‘the history of structures’ in La 
Méditerraneé and invoked ‘structures’ sparingly, whereby it appears problematic to trace 
Conze’s key term to Braudel.33 Rather what Conze inherits ostensibly from Braudel, I 
propose, is the Freyerian emphasis on accumulated historical strata. The vocabulary of 
structures and the associated geological imagery are significantly more dominant in Freyer 
than Braudel, and Conze’s programmatic essays in the 1950s are full packed with explicit and 
implicit references to Freyer. Conze coined the term Strukturgeschichte out of material 
gradually accumulated in the work of Freyer, Brunner, and Braudel in a manifold process of 
filtration, based on direct personal engagement.34 Instead of being “based on a 
misunderstanding of the concept of structure developed in the discussion between French 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Hans Freyer, Machiavelli (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1938), 123. 
28 Hans Freyer, “Gegenwartsaufgaben der deutschen Soziologie,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 
95, 1935, 116-144, 120-121. 
29 Ibid, 127. 
30 Freyer, Soziologie, 67. 
31 Dunkhase, Werner Conze, 133-134. 
32 Ibid. 138. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Freyer’s influence on Brunner and Conze came partly mediated through one of their mentors, the historian 
Hans Rothfels (Jin-Sung, Bild, 53-54). However, they also socialized with Freyer directly. In 1930-31, Conze 
studied in Leipzig where Freyer served as a professor of sociology, and from 1951 to 1957 Conze was in 
Münster, where Freyer taught as an emeritus from 1953 to 1963 and wrote his Theorie des gegenwärtigen 
Zeitalters -- in both occasions, Freyer had “substantial influence on Conze’s historical thought,” as noted by 
Dunkhause (Werner Conze, 23 and 75). Also Brunner interacted with Freyer, for instance co-organizing a 
workshop in 1952 (Muller, “‘Historical Social Science,’” 228). 
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historians and structuralists,” as Hans-Ulrich Wehler once polemicized35, Strukturgeschichte 
thus rather relied on domestic impulses, only seasoned with further French reflections on 
time. 
Three Freyerian points are pertinent here. First, social structures were inherently political 
in that they emerged and dissolved on the basis of political events and decisions. Like Freyer, 
Brunner and Conze denied the demarcation between social and political history. When 
reading Brunner’s 1954 remark on the alleged difference between social history and political 
history, Conze forcefully denied any such distinction -- a point adopted by Brunner in a 1956 
revision.36 Conze’s remark appears slightly patronizing, as Brunner had already in 1936 
observed the need of human communities for inner order and the capability to defend 
themselves, whereby they were of “historical-political nature,” and “all history” was “political 
history,” as noted directly after an explicit reference to Freyer’s idea of sociology as a science 
of reality.37 After the war, Conze marketed this idea and retained the link to Freyer: there 
were no social formations that would not have emerged politically, and Braudel’s levels of the 
history of structures and the history of events mutually conditioned each other, Conze noted38 
-- in other words: structures not only guided events, but contingent political events also 
produced structures. Both history and sociology, Conze observed, studied the society, which 
was “always structured in the particular political order” and was “a structured order of 
authority” -- a phrase Conze put in inverted commas and attributed to Freyer.39 The study of 
history was thereby “political” even when it had social phenomena as its objects.40 This 
perspective followed effortlessly from the political-theoretical assumptions behind Freyer’s 
“structures” and the way Freyer himself utilized these categories in historical analysis in 
Weltgeschichte Europas. In an essay that made references to that volume and two other texts 
by Freyer, Brunner noted that just as little as the actions of social formations could be 
understood without studying their inner construction could “the relatively enduring 
structures” be comprehended “independently of political events.”41 The Freyerian perspective 
of political decisions affecting history was particularly salient in Conze, who in 1949 lauded 
Weltgeschichte Europas for its “truly exciting presentation of decisions related to world 
history” and in 1957 argued for the inseparability of political and social history by 
emphasizing the need to take “political struggle and political decisions” into account.42 
Second, the structures lasted longer than the political impulses that brought them about: 
they thus provided historical continuity and carried contemporary relevance. Conze spelled 
this point in unmistakably Freyerian quasi-geological language. Alluding to Freyer’s notion in 
inverted commas, he described the task of structural history as that of studying “the 
contemporary era” by means of “empirical-historical research on its historical stages, strata, 
and structural connections.”43 In a 1952 essay, he explicitly cited Freyer’s note from the same 	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year that history must be reflected in a “crosswise striped [quergestreift]” manner.44 On the 
very same page, Conze discussed Braudel and coined the term “Strukturgeschichte” – but the 
metaphors evidently came from Freyer. 
Third, concepts were embedded in politically constituted and historically accumulated 
structures. This aspect serves to show how subtly the historicity of concepts in 
Begriffsgeschichte emanated from the historicity of social structures. In 1952, Freyer noted 
the risk inherent in formalizing concepts stemming from “the industrial society,” such as 
‘classes,’ ‘class struggle,’ or ‘ideology,’ and transferring them onto feudal social settings.45 In 
an essay published in the selfsame journal later that year, Conze correspondingly noted the 
late emergence of ‘economy’, ‘society,’ and ‘state’ in modernity and asked whether 
‘proletariat,’ ‘capitalism,’ and ‘class’ were concepts specific to “the modern industrial 
society.”46 Rather than being an ephemeral postwar similarity, this link derived from prewar 
interaction between Freyer and Brunner. In Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft (1930), 
Freyer analyzed sociology as a historical formation reflecting the societal reality of a 
particular era. Consequently, sociological concepts like ‘class,’ ‘proletariat,’ ‘metropolis,’ or 
‘state’ reflected the reality and problems of a particular social order, were “historically 
saturated”47 and characterized by “historical boundedness,” and, in order to be properly 
comprehended, had to be tied to the “historical situation” and the “epoch.”48 Sociological 
categories like ‘oikos,’ ‘metropolis,’ ‘slavery,’ ‘caesarismus,’ ‘estate,’ ‘state,’ or ‘society’ 
were thus qualitatively different from the general concepts of natural science.49 Rather than 
being “timelessly valid concepts,” for instance ‘patriarchal princehood,’ ‘free competition,’ or 
‘free labor market’ were valid only for a while.50 Freyer’s attempt to historicize sociology 
entailed the endeavor of freeing historical reflection of Hegelian teleology, and one crucial 
aspect of this was the reinterpretation of concepts as historically satiated categories with 
social and political relevance rather than as supra-historical philosophical abstractions that 
merely unfolded in world history. This, however, did not entail unrestrained relativism, but 
the stratified model rather served to secure historical continuities. “Logos” was to be replaced 
with “reality,” on the one hand, but “steps” (Stufen) in the world-historical process also 
supplemented with “layers” (Schichten)51 that remain in effect longer, thus unifying past and 
future, on the other. 
Freyer’s perspective profoundly inspired Brunner. Freyer for instance proposed that the 
significance of medieval poetry could not be comprehended without the concepts of chivalry 
and feudalism and “the whole societal structure of the medieval world.”52 This was the 
perspective Brunner would generalize in Land and Lordship (1939), arguing that historians 
had anachronistically projected the modern state/society distinction onto their medieval 
sources. Brunner, famously, built on Schmitt’s ideas of political communities as “concrete 
orders”53 in an attempt to find new spatial and social groundings for political communities, 
thereby providing an alternative to the shallow liberal doctrines. Yet, the perspective also -- 
and for the emerging conceptual history, more decisively -- built on Freyer’s point on the 
historical saturation of concepts. In a 1936 review, Brunner noted that the historian was 	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engaged not with the historical genesis of individual phenomena, but with “the historical 
becoming of his own world, the concrete formations of folk and state, in which he lives,”54 
thus stating the contemporary relevance of studying past political structures which he would 
express more forcefully in Land und Herrschaft. Brunner also noted, with explicit reference 
to Freyer, that sociology was a “science of reality,” yet itself bound up with the bourgeois 
society, and that its concepts were therefore not directly transferable to preceding epochs.55 
Key categories were not to be “liberated from the current overall structure [Gesamtgefüge]” 
and “the concrete economic structures.”56 In the book under review, the historian Ernst K. 
Winter, however, had done precisely that: invoking concepts like “the state,” “economy,” 
“social policy,” “feudalism,” “capitalism,” and “socialism,” which in Brunner’s formulation 
“belonged to the nineteenth century,” Winter manifested the “deficiency of transferring the 
sociological conceptual world of today to the middle ages.”57 When these points recurred in 
Land und Herrschaft, Brunner had retained, and in fact augmented, the references to Freyer as 
the authoritative antipode of such anachronism; after the war, however, he omitted the 
references completely, thus obscuring the link between himself and Freyer for those using the 
nowadays widely available 1965 edition.58 
Further, Freyer fundamentally shaped Brunner’s observations of what hindered 
contemporary scholars from seeing the medieval world in its own conceptual terms –the 
modern industrial society. In the early 1930s, Freyer noted that European sociology was, 
through its own genesis, tied to specific eighteenth- and nineteenth-century forms of thought, 
such as the optimistic and progress-oriented philosophy of history and the state/society 
division.59 Freyer posited that the Germans still thought like the nineteenth century, but 
envisioned the key ideas of that epoch were now dissolving, actively calling for a revolution 
from the right to overcome the liberal epoch and what remained of the nineteenth-century 
“industrial society.”60 He anticipated the semi-mythological Volk61 to emerge as a 
counterforce and to “break from below into the plain of the industrial society, crosswise 
through all its conflicts of interests.”62 The volcanic model suggested the ability of the 
political Volk to reorganize social structures, yet, through the idea of lava again solidifying, 
the image also implied the continuing presence of the Volk. The double metaphor is far from 
insignificant. As Muller importantly emphasizes, for Freyer, “the Volk remained an ongoing 
historical reality ... upon which later social structures were based.”63 Freyer indeed 
underscored Volk as the most relevant form of community for “the European present” and 
described this with the habitual vocabulary of “overlying,” “underground,” “structures,” and 
“layers.”64 While ‘society’ was merely a product of a specific liberal epoch, for Freyer ‘Volk’ 
could, perplexingly, escape such narrow confines: the proper object of sociology was the 
trans-historical Volk in its various “historical ways of life.”65 	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Brunner similarly saw the state, culture, and the social structure as condensed in the 
concepts Volk and Reich, whereby history from the Middle Ages to the present could be 
written as a single Volksgeschichte -- provided one glossed over nineteenth-century 
liberalism. Brunner’s ideas coalesced not only with Schmitt’s theorizing of concrete orders, 
but also with Freyer’s ideological opposition between the Volk and the industrial society. 
Brunner’s call for tracing “basic concepts” (Grundbegriffe) to the original and concrete social 
forms was directly related to the attempt to think around the liberal nineteenth-century 
framework that jeopardized true historicity.66 In fact, echoing Freyer’s considerations, 
Brunner explicitly noted that the “conceptual apparatus of the nineteenth century” had to be 
“destroyed.”67 In underlining what we would now call the “contextual” approach, Brunner, 
nevertheless, implied the transhistorical relevance of some key concepts. The particular 
political version of historicism, which Brunner inherited from Freyer, did not relativize the 
past into a completely foreign country, but, on the contrary, rather underlined its relevance for 
the present via the category of the Volk. 
After the war, Brunner changed his terminology and simply substituted Strukturgeschichte 
for Volksgeschichte.68 In 1948, he rather spoke of “social history,” still, however, insisting 
that medieval social structures could not be understood with the concepts of ‘society,’ ‘class,’ 
and ‘estate’ alone, but categories like ‘authority’ and ‘cooperative association’ had to be 
included in the analysis69 and the “whole inner structure [innere Struktur] of the land in 
question” considered.70 Expanding this perspective, Brunner later advised historians to 
analyze the entire “inner structure [inneres Gefüge] of the West.”71 By introducing the 
language of ‘structures,’ Brunner effectively toned down the political ramifications of his 
methodology, yet did not thereby become any less Freyerian. Both Volk and Struktur/Gefüge 
were crucial parts of Freyer’s vocabulary, and Brunner’s shift, I posit, was a change of 
emphasis within the Freyerian theoretical space rather than a breakaway from it. 
Importantly, Gefüge was the term Freyer used in linking concepts with social structures: 
“Only in being historically satiated are sociological concepts capable of carving out the 
structure [Gefüge] of a given social order in full clarity.”72 Brunner read ‘feudalism’, 
‘authority,’ and ‘cooperative association’ as such historically satiated basic concepts, refilled 
in historical circumstances and thereby capable of informing us about the social reality of the 
era. Koselleck later similarly spoke of conceptual “structures,” yet altered the perspective: 
rather than scrutinizing the relationship between social structure and individual concepts 
directly, like Freyer and Brunner, he related each historical concept to the overall conceptual 
structure (Begriffsgefüge) and analyzed concepts’ interrelations and each concept’s weight 
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within the structure73, linking the overall conceptual structure to the current social structure 
(soziale Gefüge) only on the next level of analysis.74 
However, concepts’ embeddedness in social structures not only enabled them to 
communicate something about the whole historical epoch, but also ensured that their 
relevance was not confined to the particular epoch. For Freyer, history was the “stratification 
of the world in which we currently live” just like the Earth was a “stratified structure of the 
layers and eruptions” of which it had accumulated; but while in geology materials could only 
lay on top of each other, or side by side, in intellectual life much remained “lively and active” 
-- that is, past formations carried contemporary relevance.75 In my interpretation, this 
perspective fed into Koselleck’s basic categories, particularly in the early 1970s when he re-
engaged with the relationship between social history and Begriffsgeschichte. It was crucial, 
Koselleck proposed, to supplement the synchronic with a diachronic perspective, which could 
“uncover layers [Schichten] that remained concealed in the spontaneous use of language.”76 
Conceptual history indeed sought to clarify such “multilayeredness [Mehrschichtigkeit] of 
meanings chronologically stemming from various times” within a single concept77 and to map 
the “the historical depth [Tiefenlage] of a concept.”78 Further, rather than being dead stone, 
these gradually or abruptly formed layers structured the ways in which we experienced the 
world, and past things were therefore always things of the present. Precisely the task of 
mapping the various strata precluded any strict diachrony/synchrony dualism and called for 
recognition of “the contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous that may be incorporated in 
a concept.”79 Language thus contained “differently staggered temporal deep structures 
[verschieden gestaffelte zeitliche Tiefenstrukturen],”80and for instance ‘progress’ carried 
“chronologically differently classifiable layers [zeitlich verschieden einzustufende 
Schichten].”81 
The geological metaphor is an essential part of the idea of the presence of the past, which 
Koselleck repeatedly expressed with the phrase “the contemporaneity of the non-
contemporaneous” (Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen). This formulation, stemming 
originally from Ernst Bloch, is a popular topos in German historical and cultural commentary, 
and both Freyer and Koselleck are important links in its development, as Achim Landwehr 
notes without, however, explicating the relationship between them.82 In 1955, Freyer 
formulated the idea as follows: 
 “One does not even have to look at the whole Earth to get the impression of the 
contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous [Gleichzeitigkeit des Nicht-
Gleichzeitigen]. Also in a single location there can be several epochs side by side, on 
top of each other, or one below the other.”83 
Already Freyer thus expresses the idea of the coexistence of various temporal elements as 
well as the spatial and geological depiction of these elements as horizontal layers in vertical 	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settings, and in his exemplar, available in the German Literature Archive, Koselleck has 
underlined the term Gleichzeitigkeit des Nicht-Gleichzeitigen. Koselleck later recapitulates 
these ideas forcefully and identically invokes the contemporaneousness topos: 
 “The term ’temporal layers’ refers, like its geological predecessor, to multiple layers of 
time with different durations and different origins that, however, are simultaneously 
present and effective. ‘Temporal layers’ also capture the contemporaneousness of the 
non-contemporaneous.’”84 
Although Koselleck only explicitly addressed the geological metaphors in his late work, 
these had accumulated for years. In Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution (1967), 
Koselleck applied the layered model of social history to early-nineteenth-century judicial, 
political, and social structures in Prussia, mapping their “overhangs, seams and breakages” 
(Überhänge, Naht- und Bruchstellen) and considering “the various layers of historical 
time.”85 In another context, Koselleck credited Braudel for the crucial suggestion to study 
historical time in its various layers and noted that if we only focus on linear progress, we miss 
the “wide plinth [Sockel] of all the structures that endure.”86 The layered approach with its 
geological underpinnings is easy to associate with Braudel -- particularly as Koselleck 
himself proposes this link. However, while Braudel still suggested that the three temporal 
levels were parts of a single “homogeneous time of the historian” as opposed to the 
discontinuities proposed by sociologists, Koselleck renounced this assumption in favor of 
multilayered non-synchronicity.87 I propose Freyer’s notes on continued presence of the past 
through the model of geological strata and the synchronicity of the non-synchronous were 
instrumental in this transition. The Koselleckian multilayeredness of historical concepts arose 
out of the Freyerian multilayeredness of social reality via the history of structures à la Conze 
and Brunner. 
As Koselleck notes in a 1999 interview, he got acquainted with Braudel in Heidelberg 
through Conze, who also regularly spoke about Braudel’s three-layered time to him, but 
Koselleck does not recall having utilized Braudel’s 1958 essay on the longue durée directly, 
adding only that he “must have read it at some point.”88 Koselleck’s reliance on Braudel thus 
appears rather flimsy; rather than the exclusive source for Koselleck’s imagery of temporal 
layers, Braudel, who also knew Freyer’s and Brunner’s work89 and socialized with Conze, can 
be seen as one contributor in a wider postwar debate. Despite his influential longue durée 
notion and its occasional accompanying geological imagery, Koselleck’s metaphorical 
language seems primarily to derive from the Freyer reception amongst proponents of 
Strukturgeschichte. To trace a metaphor exclusively to a single author would be to 
misconceive the very nature of metaphors as linguistic resources equally at everybody’s 
disposal once they have been uttered, and particularly in the German postwar cultural debates 
thinkers freely adopted each other’s categories. However, given Freyer’s undeniable impulses 
to Koselleck’s closest collaborators Brunner and Conze and Koselleck’s own demonstrated 
reading of Freyer, the linguistic parallels between Freyer and Koselleck appear as far from 
coincidental. Helge Jordheim’s note that Koselleck derived the notion of structure not from 	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structural linguistics but from the pre-WWII Strukturgeschichte is correct,90 but deserves to 
be supplemented by noting that as far its functions and imagery were concerned, Koselleck’s 
notion of structures reworked Conze’s Freyerian starting points. 
This is not to say that Koselleck’s would not have gone significantly beyond Freyer’s 
perspectives; Koselleck’s suggestion that the various temporal layers can also be detected 
within individual concepts91, and concepts thus utilized as means of studying prevailing or 
repetitive structures, opens new vistas to the study of history in general and European 
modernity in particular. However, this methodological step, I argue, was contingently and 
decisively prepared by Freyer’s twofold contribution: first, his note on the epoch-
boundedness and historically satiated nature of concepts and their concomitant ability to 
provide information on past social structures, and second, his observation on the simultaneous 
presence of multiple past epochs in each contemporary moment, expressed in geological 
terms. As soon as we refuse to consider these suggestions separately and rather apply the 
latter theorem to the former, it follows that the key concepts of a certain era reflect its layered 
experiences and are invariably loaded with material deriving from previous epochs, and that 
this is by no means the case only for the “contemporary era” Freyer perceived as politically 
and intellectually problematic. On the basis of the layered model, concepts gain their ability to 
express not only the past, but also the past of the past, not to mention the often politically 
conditioned past futures. Koselleck combined the two perspectives into a formal theory of 
historical times, partly based on Freyerian elements mediated through Brunner and Conze.  
 
III History, Planning, and Concepts in Political Modernity 
 
Koselleck’s idea of the internal temporalization of concepts rested upon a set of more general 
theoretical propositions and historical hypotheses that accumulated since the 1950s -- under 
the influence of Freyer’s cultural philosophy, I argue. For the young Koselleck, the modern 
world emerged from the Enlightenment philosophers’ hypocritical engagement with the 
ancien régime in ostensibly neutral, but in reality moral and political categories, and the 
assault was legitimized, and the ensuing crisis covered, with a progress-oriented philosophy 
of history.92 This political maneuver had historical and conceptual implications, which 
Koselleck theorized more generally in the 1960s and 1970s. During the “saddle time,” the 
former many histories were replaced by a single and supposedly unified history, whereby 
history also became more easily foreseeable, manageable, and ostensibly capable of being 
planned on the basis of utopian ideology. Expectations surpassed experiences, and the past, 
the present, and the future were torn apart. These arguments had direct conceptual 
implications and underlay the heuristics of Begriffsgeschichte: after a “temporalization” of 
concepts during the saddle time, modernity was characterized by increased contestation with 
future-oriented categories and, consequently, by permanent ideological controversy, both 
traceable to the late-eighteenth-century political crisis.93 
Koselleck’s early work famously contained elements from Schmitt, Löwith, Heidegger, 
Gadamer, and others,94 but I will supplement the picture with observations on Freyer’s 
contributions, using the criticism of the philosophy of history as an inlet into the thematics 	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shared by both Freyer and Koselleck. Earlier research has traced Koselleck’s engagement 
with the philosophy of history primarily to Löwith, which is plausible per se, given that 
Koselleck and Hanno Kesting, who were also involved in translating Meaning in History 
(1949, German edition 1953)95, were obviously inspired by the volume. So was, however, 
Freyer, who found in Löwith’s book many familiar arguments. Freyer had criticized “the 
philosophy of history” already in the 1920s96, called for the liberation of sociology from 
eighteenth-century philosophy of history by Turgot, Saint-Simon, Comte, and others, in the 
1930s97, and analyzed philosophy of history as secularized eschatology in the 1940s98, before 
assaulting present-day political “chiliasm,” with explicit reference to Löwith, in 1955.99 There 
are five parallels between Freyer’s and Koselleck’s respective critiques of the philosophy of 
history I wish to note. 
First, both authors underscored the plural and open-ended nature of history in opposition to 
the singularity, directedness, and inevitability postulated by the Enlightenment philosophy of 
history. The criticism of the philosophy of history was an essential part of Freyer’s struggle 
with the Hegelian heritage and his attempt to jettison any residues of telos-oriented 
metaphysics from historical sociology in the 1930s -- and thus predates the Cold War. Freyer 
saw no goal or direction in history, but only contingency and particularity. This entailed the 
idea that, in the absence of a Hegelian overarching principle, world-history was essentially 
plural, rather than unified as claimed by Geschichtsphilosophie. Already in 1923, Freyer 
noted that “history thinks in plurals”100 and criticized the “Voltaire-like” belief in steady 
progress which attempted to mold human history as a “unity” rather than “plurality”101, and 
after WW2, he forcefully restated the “plurality” of history as opposed to the fictional world 
unity, underpinned by modern liberal or Marxian philosophies of history.102 History was 
essentially “open.”103 Further, progress-oriented philosophy of history was wrong also in 
depicting history as irreversible steps, while any empirical progress in history was only 
relative and always restricted by the continued presence, and possible reactivation, of earlier 
layers. The criticism of the philosophy of history thus contributed to the same goal as the 
framework of geological stratification, analyzed earlier. 
These criticisms shed new light also on how Koselleck conceived history as open-ended 
and plural104 -- an aspect particularly emphasized by Niklas Olsen.105 In my view, Olsen 
correctly underscores the link between Koselleck’s emphasis on the plurality of history and 
the theory of temporal layers.106 To me, however, instead of showing the Löwithian nature of 
Koselleck’s criticism of Heidegger’s individualist orientation in history, this link rather 
underlines the extent to which Koselleck operated in a Freyerian framework. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that, in his exemplar, Koselleck has underlined three 	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passages where Freyer evokes the “pluralism of the historical world.”107 For both thinkers, the 
notion of temporal layers and the contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous arose out of 
the rejection of the single linear progress postulated by the Enlightenment thinkers for 
political purposes -- the emphasis on historical plurality was thus internally linked with the 
multilayeredness of history, and both were intertwined in the criticism of the philosophy of 
history. While other scholars expressed ideas similar to those of plurality and 
multilayeredness, respectively, their combination and Koselleck’s actual use of them suggest 
inspiration from Freyer. 
Second, both thinkers resisted the idea that history could be planned. Like the goal-
orientation of unified history, also this aspect emerged out of Christian eschatology by 
secularization of the divine plan: while leaving room for human rationality and judgment, the 
figure of thought, with reference to the inevitability of salvation, also ensured that the human 
plan would actually unfold. Freyer had been analyzing the relationship between planning and 
political power since the 1930s108, and in his postwar work he criticized the ideas of 
“makeability” (Machbarkeit) and the “perfectability of history” behind Cold War ideological 
planning. The doctrine of perfectability presumed erroneously that history could be “made” or 
“planned,” which was a utopian aspiration and, further, easily turned violent in executing the 
plan, as evinced by the Jacobin terror.109 This was the perspective that was carried over from 
Koselleck doctoral dissertation to his mature work. In Kritik und Krise, Koselleck first 
invoked the Enlightenment “misunderstanding” of history as something “plannable” 
(planbar), and later analyzed how the philosophy of history legitimized such utopian planning 
of the future, gave contingent choices an aura of inevitability, and thereby both concealed and 
intensified the political crisis brought about by the critique of the Enlightenment 
philosophers.110 In the 1960s and 1970s, Koselleck’s repeatedly invoked the “makeability 
[Machbarkeit] of history” 111 together with its “producability,”112 “availability,”113 and 
“plannability.”114 The illusory makeability of history also manifested in concepts: since the 
saddle time, political and social concepts increasingly condensed future expectations and 
relied on utopian philosophy of history, oscillating between abstract inevitability and human 
makeability. ‘Revolution’ thus became something “plannable,” yet “autonomous,”115 and 
‘progress’ was equally “plannable” or “producible,” 116 that is, a human task, while 
simultaneously remaining historically inavoidable on a legitimatory level. These theoretical 
observations provided the fuel for Koselleck’s empirical explorations on concepts, and Freyer 
arguably equipped Koselleck with a critical tool, the argument concerning Machbarkeit. 
Third, another aspect of ideological planning was its increased scale in the Cold War 
context. The spaces for which plans were made, Freyer argued, had expanded into continents 
or even the whole planet, which had turned the globe into a single “unified force field.”117 Yet 
due to the underlying tensions, the political unity of the world was still illusionary despite the 	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liberal doctrine of progress and the Marxian ideology of planning, and the world was a 
“political force field ... loaded with enormous tensions.” 118 The world unity proposed by the 
philosophy of history had been attained only in the weak sense of technology, war, and 
political conflicts gaining global dimensions. This perspective derived from Weltgeschichte 
Europas, which argued more broadly that the problems of the contemporary world resulted 
from the spreading of European impulses throughout the world in the form of the “world-
history of Europe.” Freyer’s book, which profoundly impressed Conze and Brunner119, also 
sparked Koselleck’s interest in the question of a single world history. In 1950, Koselleck 
wrote a review of Freyer’s Weltgeschichte Europas together with Karl Jaspers’s Vom 
Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte120, and in a 1953 letter to Schmitt, Koselleck lauded 
Freyer’s book in the context of sketching an alternative ontology of history to counter 
Meineckean historicism, as pointed out by Olsen.121 Freyer’s volume particularly taught 
Koselleck to read world history as reflecting European political impulses, as evinced by the 
very first sentence of Kritik und Krise: “The contemporary world crisis, defined through the 
polar tension of the world powers of America and Russia, is -- historically speaking -- the 
result of European history. European history has expanded into world history and becomes 
fulfilled in this world history insofar as it has brought the whole world into a condition of a 
permanent crisis.“122 Koselleck did not attribute the idea to Freyer, whose Europe book he 
cited some pages later in a rather marginal context.123 The point, however, reappeared 
reformulated in Koselleck’s 1975 entry on “history.” Since WW2, the stage of “round world 
history” had been reached and “centers of action” disseminated “pluralistically upon the Earth 
from Europe.”124 When the aspirations for genuinely universal history ran aground with 
modern historicism, they remained what they had always been – the “world-history of 
Europe,” Koselleck now noted with explicit reference to Freyer’s volume. It was only in the 
twentieth century, he added, that this European world-history “began to change over to 
‘world-history itself’,” whereby the “horizon of expectations created with the concept 
[‘history’] by the eighteenth century” was “transformed, but not yet transcended.”125 The 
remark alluded to Freyer’s point that a de facto universality of world history had been 
achieved in modernity, but, alas, only through the universalizing tendency of technology and 
its purest manifestation, the war machinery, rather than by any apotheosis of civilization and 
humanity as forecast by the philosophy of history. 
Fourth, we must note that already Freyer traced the contemporary problem to the 
Enlightenment philosophy of history, posited a novel orientation to historical time therein, 
and described this as a direct consequence of political planning, thus preparing the ground for 
Koselleck’s theory of the temporalization of history and concepts in modernity. The future 
first “broke into history” in Christian eschatology, but only its secularized successor, the 
doctrine of civilization, reason, and progress, turned the transcendental temporal scheme into 
a matter of immanent human activity.126 Rather than valuing the contemporary moment as a 
product of the past and maintaining its openness toward the future, the progress-oriented 	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doctrines made it an “eye of the needle” through which history had to pass; the degree to 
which future progress had already been attained became a criterion for the present, and the 
human beings hereby “oriented themselves toward historical time” and found a proper place 
“between the past and the future.”127 For Freyer, this was a consequence of history having 
become perfectable by human planning, and the new temporality had unmistakable political 
underpinnings. Only those in control of the present could “force the bottlenecks through 
which all innovation had to go”128, although philosophy of history served justificatory ends by 
disguising genuine political liabilities as historical inevitability. Obviously, Koselleck’s 
interpretation of the emergence of a fully temporal history in early modernity is not reducible 
to Freyer’s observations, yet we should not overlook how Freyer forged the link between 
planning and the new temporality and foreshadowed Koselleck’s theorem. 
Fifth, already Freyer noted the conceptual ramifications of the new orientation to historical 
time through planning. On account of their all-encompassing philosophy of history, the 
Enlightenment philosophers, Freyer posited, could use “vague general concepts” like 
“humanity, civilization, natural law, or progress” and still communicate something 
tangible129, and particularly the hovering between the inevitability of secularized eschatology 
and active human makeability “overdetermined” the notion of progress as used since the 
eighteenth century by early socialists, positivists, young Hegelians, liberals, and 
technocrats.130 The concept of ‘progress’ was thus general, but its uses were particular and 
linked with concrete acts of planning. Progress became a “flag” that each party “snatched” 
from other parties’ hands, claiming that they, rather than their rivals, represented genuine 
progress.131 The new temporality thus not only situated the humankind between past and 
future, but also gave rise to novel vocabulary that could be utilized to direct the transition -- 
and quarreled over. 
In his post-war leaflet on political basic concepts, Freyer generalized this perspective into 
the idea that political concepts were “flags” capable of uniting people, moving political 
history, and, rather than only summarizing the movements retrospectively, also “showing 
them the way” in “bold anticipation [Vorgriff].”132 In being used for various political projects, 
political concepts attained different meaning and became weapons against political 
adversaries, but also means of disguising one’s genuine interests, and concepts were the more 
capable of fulfilling this function the more ambiguous they had become -- a passage 
Koselleck forcefully underlined in his exemplar.133 These observations suggest that also 
Freyer had a doctrine of political concepts in the postwar era, comparable to, and possibly 
influenced by, that of Schmitt, which also shaped Koselleck’s corresponding view of 
concepts.134 Like Koselleck’s, also Freyer’s view arose by generalization of the arguments 
regarding Enlightenment, underscored the role of concepts in guiding history, and depicted 
concepts as reloadable carriers of political energies. Rather than Schmitt’s more openly 
partisan “politics of concepts,”135 Freyer’s postwar view was closer to the constructive strand 
in Koselleck’s theorizing insofar as Freyer noted that analyzing political concepts historically 
could not “reconcile political battle,” but nevertheless “detoxify it.”136 Koselleck has 	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annotated the passage with a line in the margin of his exemplar, and Freyer’s moderate 
approach may have contributed to his reformulation of the political aspect of 
Begriffsgeschichte. 
There are thus extensive parallels between Freyer and Koselleck regarding the plurality 
and open-endedness of history, the criticism of history’s plannability, the idea of world 
history as widened European history, a new temporal horizon in the eighteenth century, and 
the conceptual ramifications thereof. Rather than reducing these links into a set of one-way 
“influences” from Freyer exclusively, however, this is a case of a more complex dynamics of 
recycling. Brunner, for instance, also adopted the criticism of the philosophy of history 
(probably influenced by Freyer, yet also relying on Löwith)137 as well as the interpretation of 
the global situation as European problems writ large.138 Many of the above themes -- such as 
unity vs. plurality of history, criticism of the philosophy of history, or the world crisis as a 
result of early-modern political conflicts writ large -- were also Schmittian themes, and 
Schmitt, who admired Freyer139, may have served as an intermediary, while Freyer also 
occasionally adopted ideas from Schmitt. Neither did, Koselleck develop the ideas of older 
scholars single-handedly, but in horizontal interaction with intellectual peers like Hanno 
Kesting and Nicolaus Sombart, both of whom also knew Freyer’s work.140 All of this 
underlines the collective nature of German postwar cultural debates. While the 
Koselleck/Freyer nexus should thus not be read reductively, the vast parallels, supported by 
Koselleck’s occasional references to Freyer as well as his documented direct engagement with 
Freyers books, however, warrant the thesis of Freyer’s formative role as regards the 
historical-political underpinnings of Koselleckian Begriffsgeschichte. Already in Freyer, the 
planning, makeability, and unity of history, as opposed to its openness and plurality, were all 
inherently linked with the new temporality and the concomitant directability of history with 
concepts. Koselleck decisively turned the setting around by perceiving matters from the 
viewpoint of concepts, eventually formulating his classical thesis on the saddle time – a 
period during which concepts, like history in general, were temporalized and gained novel 
meanings.  
 
IV Epochal thresholds and the Sattelzeit 
 
The very term and metaphor of “saddle time” has a complex history of its own, involving 
Freyer’s ideas of ‘cesura’ and ‘epochal threshold.’ In a late interview, Koselleck denied that 
the Sattelzeit concept was inspired by Jaspers’s notion of the “the axial age,” but he more or 
less glossed over the interviewer’s suggestion of a link with how Schmitt and Freyer spoke of 
a structural “rupture.”141 Rather than acknowledging a connection to Freyer’s work, Koselleck 
repeatedly cast Sattelzeit as a spontaneously invented and humorous catchword for a grant 
application, a term only later assuming a life of its own. He also lamented that the term was 
ambiguous and misleading because of its inherent metaphoricity.142 	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Indeed, the metaphorical aspects have often been misunderstood: despite Koselleck’s 
diffuse equine interests, the saddle time thesis is only marginally related to horses and horse 
saddles, while its primary meaning is geological and geographical. “Saddle” (Sattel, 
Bergsattel) is also a geological term referring to a point of passage between two mountains or 
the lowest point on a mountain ridge between two peaks, where it is the easiest to go across 
the mountain, from one valley to another.143 Spatially, the saddle area is a gateway to another 
space, yet simultaneously an obstacle to be overcome by exertion; in temporal terms, it 
signifies a transition phase with duration. The saddle metaphor thus rest upon a wider journey 
metaphor with a narrative structure and rich ramifications, including, importantly, an implied 
visual metaphor: whilst standing on the highest point on the route, i.e. the saddle point, one 
can see both the route one has already traveled and what still lies ahead. 
Koselleck himself notes the alpine and visual layer of meaning in a late commentary: “One 
of the meanings of Sattel refers to horses, to the equestrian world, and another refers to the 
situation experienced when one climbs to the top of a mountain and from there can 
contemplate a larger view.”144 The visual aspect is crucial for Koselleck’s use of the 
metaphor: the saddle time is a transition period during which the pre-modern meanings of 
European social and political concepts were still accessible to anyone – and the future 
foreseeable. After the passage to the other side of the saddle, however, we moderns can no 
longer understand (“see”) the meanings of pre-modern concepts directly, and future 
expectation have also surpassed any contemporary experience. The saddle time is thus 
simultaneously, first, a spatial metaphor implying a spatial extension like that in a landscape; 
second, a journey metaphor implying temporal duration and direction; third, a geological and 
alpine metaphor implying the tediousness of climbing; and, fourth, a visual metaphor 
implying seeing widely and to two directions whilst on top of the saddle. 
Scholars have correctly identified many of the connotations of the saddle time metaphor. 
Particularly Jordheim notes both the spatial and visual aspects in Koselleck’s image and 
makes two intriguing suggestions regarding the origin of the image: he first, refers to 
Husserl’s idea of the contemporary moment as an extended field, continuity, or a saddle, and, 
second, cites William James’s note on the contemporary moment as a ”saddle-back, with a 
certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched and from which we look in two directions 
into time.”145 Further, some scholars have traced the term to Brunner’s influence on 
Koselleck146 -- justly, given Brunner’s non-metaphorical summary of the key idea in 1949: 
“Words like ‘state’, ‘society’, ‘nation’, ‘people’, ‘economy’, ‘family’, ‘culture’, or 
‘civilization -- so self-evident to us -- received the meanings that we attach to them only since 
the eighteenth century[.] ... The European world of nobility relied on other concepts ... that we 
have to cumbersomely paraphrase if we wish to really comprehend their meaning.”147 The gist 	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of the saddle time thesis can thus be found in Brunner, who also spoke of “wide transition 
areas” between epochs148, thereby representing temporal transitions in spatial terms. Further, 
Müller and Schmieder have recently suggested the historian Richard Koebner as a source of 
inspiration for the thesis, although not the metaphor.149 The core idea may have come partially 
from Brunner or Koebner, and, in principle, Koselleck may have been familiar with Husserl’s 
and/or James’s formulations; yet it seems more likely that Koselleck’s framing of the saddle 
time and the associated imagery were inspired by Freyer’s theorizing of “cesura” and 
“threshold” in Weltgeschichte Europas (1948), Theorie des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters (1955) 
and Schwelle der Zeiten (1965). 
In the last volume, Freyer used the image of overstepping a threshold as a metaphor for the 
transition to the industrial society – a process of adaptation, which in his view was still on-
going. In substantial terms, crossing a threshold referred to a period of transition to a new 
epoch and the associated unintentional macro-level processes, but Freyer described this a 
transition in spatial terms as a passage in alpine landscape. In this argumentative context, 
Freyer describes Schwelle metaphorically as follows: 
“A threshold ... [is] the intermediary landscape [Zwischengelände] between two 
territories, the mountain pass [Paß] between two opposed drainage bases, a watershed 
and a weather divide, a barrier and simultaneously a bridge. On this side and on the 
other side of it one finds oneself on different niveau, perhaps even in another climate. 
To get from one to another, we must dare with the threshold, manage with it, and 
overcome it.”150 
Freyer had, however, prepared the image by speaking earlier of a cesura (break, 
interruption, pause), which he linked intimately with epochal shifts. Four aspects of the 
Schwelle/Zäsur metaphor are crucial to note here in order to show the link with Koselleck’s 
saddle time thesis. First, Freyer’s threshold was simultaneously an obstacle to be overcome 
and a bridge to another world, comparable to a mountain pass. This layer of meanings brings 
Freyer’s Schwelle very close to Koselleck’s Sattel, which in geological language referred 
precisely to a lowest point in a mountain ridge through which transition to the other side was 
possible. Earlier Freyer had repeatedly spoken of European history being forced through a 
“bottle neck” or “choke point” (Engpaß)151, which carries similar alpine connotations. Now 
he proposed that the epochal threshold (epochale Schwelle) led to “a new life-world”152 and 
that, rather than the last phase of civilization, the industrial society was a “threshold into a 
new world situation” (die Schwelle zu einer neuen Weltsituation)153, thus molding the 
threshold as a point of passage. The terms Schwelle and Sattel were not only semantically 
nearly synonymous in geological parlance but also functionally equivalent in their usage. 
Second, the transition across the threshold had a temporal extension. The shift to the 
industrial society at the turn of the eighteenth century was a “world-historical cesura” (eine 
weltgeschichtliche Zäsur) comparable only to the shift to sedentism in the Neolithic period154, 
a “cesura” with “an epochal character,”155 and a “cultural threshold” (Kulturschwelle).156 This 
transition had “an epochal character” in the original Greek sense of epokhe: in such turning 
points, history comes to a “pause” or “abeyance” (Schwebezustand) and “lingers [sich 	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aufhalten] in the epochs before crossing them,” whereas the chiliastic perspective within the 
modern belief in progress, misleadingly turned the present moment into a stadium (Stufe) to 
be “overstepped [überschritten] as soon as possible.”157 Rather than being a momentary turn, 
Freyer’s “cesura” thus denoted a period of transition: not only a turning point between eras 
but also an era in itself – both meanings being present in the etymology of “epoch.” Similarly, 
the threshold began “subterraneously” and with “anticipations,” but “no impatience or haste” 
could make the threshold “shorter” than it was, and one could easily be led to believe that one 
had already defeated the threshold when “the steep degrees” only began.158 
Third, as the last words indicate, Freyer expressed the temporal extension of cesura 
metaphorically in spatial and physical terms, invoking the connotations of movement and 
traveling by foot in an alpine landscape. This aspect was enhanced by the fact that Freyer 
used ‘cesura’ (Zäsur) and ‘threshold’ (Schwelle) coextensively. In 1948, he ridiculed Saint-
Simon, Comte, and their contemporaries for having believed that the “way of humankind” led 
unavoidably from belligerent to industrial society and that the current era had already 
overstepped (überschritten) this threshold (Schwelle).159 In 1955 he noted how the humankind 
had currently not yet crossed (überschreiten) the threshold to the industrial society, but was 
only in the second phase of the “ascent,” as Freyer noted in a passage constantly hovering 
between literal and metaphorical landscapes and incorporating Goethe’s description of his 
ascent to the Italian city of Taormina and its the panoramic vistas.160 
Fourth, the end of the journey was open precisely because the humanity had not yet 
reached the highest point, but was “in the middle of the threshold.”161 What lied “beyond the 
threshold” could only be “anticipated” or “expected,” not “imagined” or “intended,” let alone 
“made into a subject of a plan.”162 The threshold was thus also an obstacle that hindered 
humankind from preconceiving the future. Rather than a “way to a destination,” the threshold 
was a “terrain” (Gelände) in which a way could possibly be found.163 If history was a road, it 
was one that only formed behind the traveller rather anything pre-set or foreseeable.164 
Always “standing” at a certain “spot” on the “way” of history, which “leads to us and through 
us,” we have no access to an “overview from a transcendental viewpoint,” but can only see 
history as progress in that, and insofar as, we participate in that history.165 The threshold was 
thus also a visual obstacle which meant that there were no guarantees that the way provided 
by the threshold would not lead to a “dead end” or “a fall into an abyss.”166 For Freyer, the 
metaphor of the threshold was, thus, another way of relativizing the false certainty of the 
Enlightenment philosophy of history in favor of the openness of history. 
The connotations are those of a mountain-climber moving uphill for better views across the 
threshold into the future, while for Koselleck the ridge rather blocked us from anymore 
comprehending the past meanings of concepts. Whereas Koselleck historicized the hike into a 
past transition in the meanings of concepts, Freyer’s pessimistic diagnosis was that European 
modernity was still struggling to ascend – and would continue to do so, because the industrial 
society was anthropologically unsuitable for human beings and the process of adaptation still 
on-going. Neither is, however, Koselleck’s “saddle” a mere one-time historical obstacle that 
blocked our view backwards into pre-modern times. “Saddle/threshold” is also metaphor for 	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our inability to see forward in time, which is a permanent condition in modernity, despite the 
misleading optimism at the height of the Enlightenment. The saddle time thesis is intimately 
linked with the makeability of history, for precisely the increased future-orientation and 
temporalization prompted the illusion of the human capability of steering history. The future 
could be -- and had to be -- planned precisely because it was unknown and undeducible from 
recurring forms.167 Simultaneously, however, the differentiation of present experiences from 
expectations and the concomitant acceleration of history made planning impossible. The 
abyss between the past and the future thus both motivated the ideological attempts to plan 
history and simultaneously grounded their inevitable failure. On this layer of meaning, the 
transition across the threshold is a mission never to be accomplished, for the saddle denotes 
precisely the point where our limited ability to foretell fails. Rather than only referring to a 
conceptual-historical thesis regarding the origins of European key concepts, Koselleck’s 
saddle image thus also captures the idea more often expressed with the commonplace of the 
horizon always escaping us; it refers to a permanent metahistorical feature and a further 
condition for any “possible history.” Koselleck never clarified this double meaning in the 
metaphor, but it becomes comprehensible when read in connection with Freyer’s historical 
theory. 
Considering the above parallels, it is unsurprising that Koselleck gradually amalgamated 
“saddle” and “threshold,” eventually using them synonymously and interchangeably. In the 
programmatic Richtlinien text (1967), he only spoke of saddle time, horizons of experience 
(sic!), and the Janus face of the concepts of the transition era, without mentioning 
thresholds.168 Fives years later, in the introduction to the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, based 
on the Richtlinien article, he invoked “epochal threshold” (Epochenschwelle) and the 
“threshold [Schwelle] of our contemporary period” without, however, identifying either 
directly with the saddle time yet.169 This reinterpretation took place only in Koselleck’s late 
work, but it was prepared in the 1970s, when Koselleck adopted ‘epochal threshold’ to his 
own vocabulary and used it in contexts involving large-scale epochal changes. For instance, 
he spoke of “crossing the epochal threshold [Epochenschwelle]”170 and a “road” leading 
“across the epochal threshold.”171 He saw the Reformation as an “epochal threshold”172, 
whereby the very concept of ‘Reformation’ was a “threshold concept” or “epochal concept” 
(Schwellenbegriff/Epochenbegriff)173 Equally, he referred to the “epochal threshold” 
(epochale Schwelle) that “in the consciousness of those involved had been crossed 
[überschritten]” in the situation after the French Revolution, leading to the demarcation of the 
most modern period (‘neueste Zeit’) from modernity (Neuzeit).174 A “threshold that would 
lead the way for modernity” (eine für die Neuzeit wegweisende Schwelle) was also crossed 
(überschritten) in the late eighteenth century as the collective singular of history emerged.175 
Koselleck spoke of the entire nineteenth century as a transition period (Übergangszeit) and an 
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“epochal threshold,”176 and, with reference to Brunner, of the “threshold [Schwelle] around 
1800.”177 
Further, a “semantic threshold of experiences” (semantische Erfahrungsschwelle) was 
perceivable around the year 1780 -- yet, Koselleck argued, the perspective of temporal 
structures and non-synchronicity enabled scholars to transgress such context-boundedness in 
favor of historical comparisons across the saddle.178 While the visual obstacle of the saddle 
prevented relating with the past directly, the stratified underground structures continued 
uninterrupted and provided continuity under, rather than over, the mountain ridge, as it were. 
Interpreted in this way, the combined metaphor of geological layers, mountain saddles and 
visual obstacles is comprehensible and turns out to be instrumental in integrating several of 
Koselleck’s ideas into a single framework. In the quasi-geological framework, the saddle time 
thesis is inherently interlinked with the theory of historical layers and non-synchronicity. 
After having adopted the language of epochal thresholds to denote long-term and large-
scale transitions, the identification of threshold time (Schwellenzeit) with the saddle time 
(Sattelzeit) followed effortlessly: in his late essays, Koselleck used the two terms 
interchangeably. He for instance spoke of the “threshold time, which for Germany can be 
located between 1750 and 1850”179 and which is thus temporally coextensive with the saddle 
time. In a late debate with Pocock, Koselleck noted that perhaps “Schwellenzeit (threshold 
period) would have been a less ambiguous metaphor” than saddle time.180 Nowadays 
commentators use the two concepts synonymously, as evinced by Müller and Schmieder’s 
reference to the “threshold and saddle time debate.”181 
In addition to Freyer, Koselleck’s terminological change may have been inspired by the 
philosopher Hans Blumenberg. On the page of one of the above instances, Koselleck referred 
to Blumenberg’s Legitimität der Neuzeit, one volume of which was entitled ‘Aspects of the 
Epochal Threshold.’182 The reference is pertinent, as Blumenberg was a theorist of epochal 
thresholds in his own right.183 Yet Koselleck seems to have acknowledged Freyer’s role 
behind Blumenberg’s similar endeavors. In an undated and unpublished sketch for a 
conference proposal, Koselleck first linked the term ‘epochal threshold’ (Epochenschwelle) to 
Blumenberg, but then credited Freyer for having brought the term to discussion in 1965.184 
This is remarkable, because in his published texts Koselleck never explicitly referred to 
Freyer as regards thresholds, and, consequently, the link with Freyer has escaped scholar’s 
attention. The link was, however, obvious to Koselleck’s colleagues: in a 1987 volume edited 
by Koselleck and Reinhart Herzog, František Graus paid attention to how Freyer’s 1965 book 
had emphasized the spatial dimensions of the threshold, and also Herzog noted how already 
Freyer tied the threshold metaphor to that of the horizon, thus further stressing that the 
threshold was linked with the visual aspect of seeing far and in a roundabout way suggesting 	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a connection to Koselleck’s Sattelzeit thesis.185 In his essay on the eighteenth century as the 
beginning of modernity, published in the same volume, Koselleck, however, neither 
commented on saddle time directly nor mentioned Freyer or Blumenberg, only stating 
vaguely that “to find a compromise between chronological milestones and structural 
determinations of depth, the expression ‘epochal threshold’ [Epochenschwelle] has gained 
currency in Germany.”186 
Koselleck repeatedly framed Sattelzeit as a spontaneous invention. The available evidence 
suggests that he did in fact coin the term, yet not without precedents that guided the formation 
and actual use of the concept, including Freyer’s ‘threshold’ and ‘cesura.’ The core idea that 
the term covered, had also been expressed with a different wording by Brunner, whose 
perceptions on the transition between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries were heavily 
indebted to Freyer. Further, Koselleck certainly did not invent the rich imagery associated 
with the Sattelzeit -- including geological, alpine, and volcanic connotations as well as those 
of a journey across a mountain range, spatial-temporal extension, and seeing far. This material 
had accumulated in Western historiography since Herodotus, but had been authoritatively 
encapsulated in Koselleck’s time by Freyer. Koselleck’s exemplar of Schwelle der Zeiten is 
not available, yet we can safely assume that he was familiar with the volume he referred to, 
and Freyer’s theorizing of threshold seems to have guided Koselleck’s use of the metaphors. 
Freyer, possibly together with Blumenberg, catalyzed Koselleck’s later reinterpretation of 
saddle time as synonymous with threshold time, and in the unpublished note, Koselleck did in 
fact credit Freyer for the term ‘epochal threshold,’ which he elsewhere only attributed to 
Blumenberg. 
 
V Conclusions 
 
Rather than an analyst of trans-historical and abstract concepts, Freyer was a “recovering 
Hegelian,” proposing politically oriented historicism extendable onto concepts. His role in the 
genesis of German historical semantics and Begriffsgeschichte has so far been 
underestimated. As shown above, Freyer was not only a major background figure in 
Brunner’s and Conze’s history of structures, but his categories also shaped Begriffsgeschichte 
and guided its way of asking questions. Before 1945, Brunner’s engagement with Freyer’s 
methodological ideas was also supported by vast parallels in their ideological aims, as 
evinced by their criticism of the industrial society and their representation of Volk as a 
permanent substructure despite the historically satiated nature of other key concepts. Brunner 
abandoned such ideological imbalance only after WW2. 
His younger colleagues Conze and Koselleck, by contrast, primarily relied on Freyer’s 
postwar re-renderings of the political dynamics of history, and encountered his 
methodological terminology, together with its supportive imagery, in deradicalized form. 
Freyer’s pre-war affirmative emphasis on the continued potential for political upheavals was 
absent in their model of layered history, while many theoretical-methodological points 
remained, such as the political nature of stratification, the multilayeredness of history, or the 
presence of the past through the contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous. This shift 
corresponds to the way Koselleck, in Mehring’s estimation, renounced the active Schmittian 
“politics of concepts” in favor of a more historically oriented approach. Despite this 
successful distanciation from political radicalism, even Koselleck’s late work on temporal 	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layers and repetitive structures, nevertheless, had “a conservative appeal.”187 My analysis, 
however, suggests that any remaining, moderately conservative emphasis in Koselleck’s 
theory of historical layers, is of Freyerian, not Schmittian, origins, and comes supported by 
the Freyerian geological imagery recycled also by Conze. 
The comparison with Freyer illuminates the interrelations between the key concepts in 
Koselleck’s theory of history. Jordheim has underscored the close relationship between the 
saddle time thesis, the eighteenth-century spatial extension of European history into world 
history, and the Gleichzeitigkeit theorem within Koselleck’s oeuvre.188 Indeed, in the global 
field of historical action – opening up during the saddle time and largely as a consequence of 
political aspirations –, experiences of the simultaneous presence of different historical layers 
became more frequent and intense, turning into a basic experience of modernity. Freyer, 
however, had not only suggested the ideas of the threshold into industrial society, the 
globalization of European political impulses in world history, and the presence of historical 
layers in the contemporary moment, but he also provided a single theoretical framework in 
which all these pieces fell into place. The overall image forming in the Koselleckian puzzle, 
too, is overwhelmingly Freyerian, although also encompassing fragments from other images. 
This is vividly emblematized by the fact that the dust jacket of the second edition of 
Weltgeschichte Europas reproduces Albrecht Altdorfer’s Alexanderschlacht -- the sixteenth-
century painting which, probably coincidentally, sparked Koselleck’s reflections on historical 
time in the opening essay of Vergangene Zukunft. 
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